Notting Hill is just one of a number of neighbourhoods in London that have been transformed in recent years by dramatic changes in the global distribution of wealth. It is not just neighbourhoods such as Notting Hill that have 'come up' that are subject to change, even in 'traditionally elite' neighbourhoods (Webber and Burrows, 2016) what we might think of now as the 'merely wealthy' are being challenged by the raw money power of the global 'super-rich' (Atkinson et al., 2016a) . This phenomenon is not just an extension to, or intensification of, 'super-gentrification' processes (Butler and Lees, 2006) ; rather it is an 'upward' colonisation by capital that can perhaps best be characterised as the emergence of a plutocratic city in which raw money-power increasingly dictates the social, political and symbolic landscapes of the urban (Atkinson et al., 2016a; 2016b) , in which even the most established wealthy neighbourhoods of London's West End (Wilkins, 2013) are subject to fundamental change. Peter York (2013; , cultural critic and long-time resident of these areas, has recently observed that even in Mayfair -perhaps the most established of elite London communities -the people who now own property are very different to a generation ago The super-rich…come from absolutely everywhere to live, work and trade in twenty-first-century Mayfair. As house buyers, they particularly come from Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Middle East…They're usually often absentees…non-doms…The tiny clutch of Brits in at that level are really non-doms too, defined by their tax status and time spent in their various houses and offices around the world (York, 2013: 46-47, emphasis in original) .
These changes highlight how urban social and economic formations reflect epochal changes -as Pahl states in his essay: 'The city is essentially a social entity -the product of a particular society at a particular time…The city is what society lets it be' (Pahl, 195: 194) . This simple dictum thus suggests that in order to better understand the contemporary urban condition we would be well advised to take account of broader global social processes, in particular the dramatic changes in global wealth inequality witnessed over the last few years (Koh et al., 2016) .
Piketty and Pahl
The scale of these changes has been dramatic at the global level. For example, Oxfam (2016) (Savage, 2014) . The analytic, conceptual, political and empirical controversies that have accompanied its publication have not detracted from its main message: that those with money capital and wealth will almost always do better than those seeking an income from work. For Piketty, if 'r' is the rate of return on capital (very broadly defined) and 'g' is the rate of economic growth, then during periods where r > g economic inequality inevitably increases as growth in income derived from capital outperforms income derived from other sources, such as salaries and wages. For most of the history of capitalism r has indeed been greater than g, except for a brief period in the middle of the twentieth century. Between about 1930 and the late 1970s g > r but only because of what now look to be some unusual circumstances, an 'historical blip' even: two World Wars, the Great Depression, the establishment of redistributive welfare states, the growth of the negotiating power of trade unions, and a few decades of rapid economic growth. Since the 1980s the relation r > g has once again asserted itself at a global level with the rate of growth of capital, where dividends are re-invested, greatly exceeding the growth of incomes. For Piketty, unless action is taken or unless the wealthy spend their returns on capital rather than saving it and passing in on to their children, we will see a return to the kind of conditions found in the nineteenth century in which the most affluent people in the world are the offspring of the existing super-elite; the rich and their descendants will get richer and, even if economic growth is sustained, concentrations of wealth and ever-greater levels of social inequality will continue apace.
From this perspective the development of much of the contemporary empirical social sciences occurred within the period of this 'historical blip' (Savage, 2010) in which levels of social inequality -for the most part at least -were lessening. The tone of the essays collected together in Pahl's (1975) Whose City? -all originally written from 1965 onwards -reflect these conditions. Although Pahl is clear at the very outset of the second edition of the book that the simple answer to his question was 'quite evidently the capitalists' (Pahl, 1975: 1) , much of what concerns him elsewhere in the essays is the question of the extent and efficacy of social policy and urban planning in ameliorating the gross social inequalities that might have otherwise resulted from such patterns of ownership and control if they were not mediated by non-market forces. Central to managing the interplay between patterns of capitalist ownership, market forces and a largely reformist welfare state were, what he termed, 'urban managers' -planners, local government officials, developers, estate agents and so on -unified only to the extent that they were able to influence the allocation of urban resources and thus mediate recursive relations between what he terms, on some occasions, 'spatial patterns and social processes' and, on others, 'urban processes and social structure'. Writing just ahead of what is now often interpreted as the final death throes of the economic long wave of Fordism, Whose City? could easily be interpreted as one of the final empirical analyses of the kind of urban spatialisation in the UK that pertained just prior to the unleashing of global neoliberalism from the mid1970s onwards.
The myriad impacts of neoliberalism on the urban form have, of course, been extensively documented (Peck et al., 2013) , and the combined influence of processes of global marketization, deregulation, privatization, individualisation, regeneration and gentrification have become the frequent hallmarks of urban life under such conditions. These contexts, in which markets are privileged in myriad guises, has also been the bedrock upon which, in Piketty's terms, the historical relation of r > g has been so Under the regimes of the 1960s and 1970s described by Pahl, 'capital' was the dominant force in understanding urban dynamics, but it was a form of capital the bearers of which remained very much 'of' the cities' (or at least the nations) in which they invested. Urban capital was predominantly under the control of individual and/or institutional actors with some interests -commercial, civic, aesthetic, political, cultural and so on -in the urban fabric and the municipal resources that they enjoyed alongside other citizens. To the extent that class conflicts and/or struggles over collective consumption existed, as articulated paradigmatically by Castells (1977) , the assumption was that the geographical reach of such strife -on all sides -was, for the most part, relatively circumscribed.
Under contemporary conditions this is no longer true of course. Processes 
Placing the Global Super-Rich
Contemporary academic interest in elites (Birtchnell and Caletrio, 2013; Savage and Williams, 2008 ) and the 'super-rich' in particular (Hay, 2013; Hay and Beaverstock, 2016) has only recently begun to match more popular cultural and journalist interest (Frank, 2007; Freeland, 2012; Rothkopf, 2008) in their fortunes and actions. Accompanying the growth in academic interest in the super-rich has come a number of well-publicized publications from the commercial sector that are also widely utilized in the extant social scientific literature in order to provide some crude estimates of the extent and distribution of the extremely wealthy across the globe (see Beaverstock and Faulconbridge, 2013; Beaverstock and Hay, 2016; Koh et al., 2016) . As we have already noted, one of the most popular of these, the annual World Wealth Reports (Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management, 2015) , calculates that in 2014 there were some 14.6 million HNWIs distributed around the globe. Of these 14.6 million: 90 per cent held assets of between $1m and $5m; 9 per cent held assets of between $5m and $30m; and just 1 per cent (some 133,300) held assets of $30m or more (Burrows, 2016) recent empirical work on the middle classes in relation to what has come to be termed the 'spatialisation of class' (Parker et al., 2007; Savage et al., 2005) . Parker et al. (2007: 904) observe that one might expect that that this notion of social class as an increasingly spatialised phenomena would derive from a sociological lineage that begins with the Chicago school of urban ecology (Park et al. 1925) and then tracks through the aforementioned urban sociology of Rex and Moore (1967) and other work by Pahl (1970) , on 'housing classes'. However, this is not so. It is, in fact, yet another manifestation of the influence of Bourdieu (1984) on contemporary social class analysis; his concepts of 'capital', 'habitus' and 'field' are used as a means of interpreting the preferences, tastes, strategies and actions of various fractions of the metropolitan middle classes. This 'turn' to Bourdieu has been especially evident in the work of analysts such as Bridge, Butler and their colleagues (Bacqué et al., 2015; Bridge, 2006; Butler with Robson 2003) , but especially Savage et al. (2005) . In a much quoted articulation of the thesis Savage et al. (2005: 207) write that:
One's residence is a crucial, possibly the crucial identifier of who you are. The sorting processes by which people chose to live in certain places and others leave is at the heart of contemporary battles over social distinction. Rather than seeing wider social identities as arising out of the field of employment it would be more promising to examine their relationship to residential location.
For Savage et al. (2005: 9) this relates to the observation that people are 'comfortable' when there is a correspondence between 'habitus' and 'field':
[O]therwise people feel ill at ease and seek to move -socially and spatially -so that their discomfort is relieved…mobility is driven as people, with their relatively fixed habitus, both move between fields…and move to places within fields where they feel more comfortable.
Such 'choices' about where to live appear to be strongly associated with all manner of other socio-cultural variables and, as such, the approach is part of a broader move to develop 'cultural class analysis' (Bennett et al., 2008) ; a form of analysis that takes patterns of cultural distinction, tastes, values and so on seriously without seeing them simply as epiphenomena of class positioning within the social relations of production. Such an approach has much to offer analytically, and techniques such as multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) demonstrate time and time again thatin an abstract conceptual space -cultural tastes and preferences often cluster together closely and correspond to clear social class differences (Bennett et al., 2008) . However, accessing appropriate data allowing anything approaching a precise and more concrete spatial mapping of such 'cultural classes' is much harder to come by. Even mega-scale web 2.0 enabled surveys (Savage et al., 2013; are unable to offer anything more than a very crude 'mapping' and although census statistics are of some use in this aspiration 'to map', the ten-year periodicity of the data and the crudity of the categories used often means that 'small populations' such as the upper echelons of the contemporary global bourgeoisie (to put it in very stark terms) become lost in plain sight. Other specialized data sources have also been explored (Hennig and Dorling, 2012) , but even here only 'city' level differences are ascertainable.
So what of the possibilities afforded by methodological innovations resulting from the supposed turn to 'big data' (Burrows, 2016) ? Are the super-rich able to circumnavigate the algorithmic gaze of, for example, the commercial geodemographics industry? It would seem not and, although far from perfect, such data -originating from 'commercial sociology' (Burrows and Gane, 2006) rather than from the state or the academy -provides us with a reasonably nuanced sense of the geographies of the global super-rich in the UK and, indeed, in many other countries as well (Burrows, 2016) .
Understanding Geodemographic Classifications
ACORN, Mosaic and a number of other such systems attribute a geodemographic classification to every residential address in the UK using a diverse set of spatially referenced data sourced from commercial and official sources. Initially these systems classified people on the basis of the attributes of the postcode in which they lived, using a mix of census statistics for census output areas and other data sources aggregated at the more detailed level of the unit postcode . 'work' only in the sense that they identify highly nuanced socio-economic and cultural differences between different postcodes that have proven 'useful' to a wide range of commercial, public sector, and political bodies (Uprichard et al., 2009) . [4] For ACORN, addresses most likely to be associated with the very wealthiest people in the UK are grouped together under the heading of 'Lavish Lifestyles', which are further differentiated into 3 sub-groups:
'Exclusive Enclaves'; 'Metropolitan Money'; and 'Large House Luxury'. The Mosaic system on the other hand, groups the very wealthy together under the auspices of the 'Alpha Territory' of which there are considered to be four distinct types: 'Global Power Brokers'; 'Voices of Authority'; 'Business Class'; and 'Serious Money'. Although such labels may also not always be to the taste of social scientific sensibilities the descriptions of the statistical clusters upon which they are based have often been found to correspond extremely well with more ethnographic descriptions of the neighbourhoods they seek to describe (Butler with Robson, 2003; Parker et al., 2007; Savage et al., 2005) .
The 'Alpha Territory'
The 'Alpha Territory' (AT) as a whole is described in the Mosaic documentation as groups of people with substantial wealth who live in the most sought after neighbourhoods in the UK. However, as we have noted, the group is internally differentiated into four quite distinct clusters. We might attempt to describe what this data reveals by starting at the level of the UK as a whole and then progressively drilling down towards ever more proximate levels of analysis. Table 1 as SeMo (22.8 per cent). Again, and not surprisingly, the distribution of this population within Greater London is anything but even, as shown in Table   2 . Those classified as GPBs have a strong preference to be resident in a small cluster of postcode areas: SW (37.5 per cent); W (37.4 per cent); and NW (19 per cent). Those classified as VoA, on the other hand, are more widely distributed but with particular concentrations in N, KT (Kingston) and HA (Harrow). Those classified as BC are particularly well represented in KT but also with a strong presence in HA and CR (Croydon). Finally, SeMo also has a strong preference for KT but also for the SW and a smaller presence in W. [7] - Table 2 About HereMoving to an even more detailed level of analysis -that of postcode districts -we can examine the numbers and concentrations of our most wealthy and most London-centric AT type, the GPBs; the territories in which they leave their residential mark are surely at the very heart of 'Pikettyville' -a city characterized by large numbers of new zones for those benefitting from global 'patrimonial capitalism'. To talk of 'Pikettyville' is then to conjure up an image of an urban system that has become hardwired to adopting, channeling and inviting excesses of social and economic capital in search of a space in which the rich not only find safe haven but are also privileged by the kind of property and income tax regimes and wider economic climate that allows them to thrive on their capital investments, while the wider city experiences some of the most challenging economic conditions since the early twentieth century (Atkinson et al., 2016b) . Table 3 shows the postcode districts in central London where the greatest numbers of the GPBs can be found. Within these 'top ten' areas some 84,171 adults classified as GPBs can be associated with these addresses.
This figure represents over 61 per cent of all those classified as GPBs in
Greater London. These then are the very core territories of the London 'super-rich'. Well over 10,000 adults can be found in each of Belgravia (14,018), Chelsea (13,112), Hampstead (12,029) and Kensington (11, 568) .
However, the greatest concentrations can be found in Kensington (58.0 per cent of its population), Chelsea (56.6 per cent) and South Kensington (50.9 per cent). In these three core areas of the Alpha Territory over onehalf of the adult populations are some of the wealthiest people on the planet.
- Table 3 We can illustrate this by returning to where we began -Notting Hill. Figure   2 shows a detailed mapping of unit postcodes in the area. The neighborhood is now dominated by those classified as GPBs (the light dots) with a small smattering of SeMo (the dark dots). This is not to say that households from other geodemographic types do not also reside here.
But it does mean that they are nowhere within a majority within any of the postcodes shown on the map.
- Figure 2 About Here -
Concluding Discussion
Mapping the 'Alpha Territory' in London is, at best, a pragmatic exercise.
We have used data originally constructed for the needs of the commercial sector because we can find no other viable alternative within the academy that would facilitate such a detailed socio-spatial analysis of the 'super-rich'. However, the classification used is clearly not ideal and so is probably best thought of as, what Blumer (1954: 7) First, and most importantly, ato repeat Pahl (1975: 1) , it is still 'quite evidently the capitalists' who own our cities. However, today that influence is ever more emphatic. Pahl's earlier prognoses about the urban as a space for capital remains not only intact but is now much more aggressively pursued (Atkinson et al., 2016a; 1016b) . If the city of the 1970s
was largely a product of struggles between local capital and labour, often over issues of 'collective consumption', today the balance of power has changed decisively as the city becomes a site of active plunder by global capital (Merrifield, 2014) ; by no means all of it legitimate (Platt, 2015; Transparency International, 2015) . 'super-rich' households moving to the area had little interest in the community, the history or the aesthetics of the place; they moved there because that was where they could find the type of house that met their exacting specifications. This led to conflicts. They were:
…generally impatient of instruments of local authority control…the requirement to respect a historical aesthetic is experienced as an onerous and unreasonable restriction on individual freedom…Following on from this is conflict over the importance of the natural environment, over trees, which can easily obstruct proposed property extensions, gardens, which have modest recreational value for many incomers, and the sightlines between houses…The third source of conflict is the attitude towards the local community itself…the reluctance of many developers to acknowledge their identity publicly and to consult with representatives of the local community estranges...[them]…from established elites and entrenches conflicts (Webber and Burrows, 2015: 12-13) Third, as Peter York explains, it is not just the super-rich as house buyers that are the issue. He points out, by way of example, how the built environment in Mayfair has been slowly transformed by, what he terms, the 'money men' who surround them; many properties have been quietly repurposed to support the financial needs of the über-wealthy.
The other overlapping players…are people who work in…[the]…huge but secretive finance sector. Mayfair is the world's 'second City' of hedge funds, private equity firms and 'family offices'. But unlike the Square Mile…the Mayfair City is discreet…Mayfair has been utterly transformed on a rather quiet basis over the last fifteen years. Little companies have floors in anonymous, upgraded blocks. Some work behind hollowed-out Georgian facades with built-out, built-on backs, 40 foot rooms where you least expect them (York, 2013: 47-49 , emphasis in original). York (2013: 49-50 ) is, justifiably, critical of the lack of attention that the social sciences have, hitherto, paid to this new financial infrastructure developing in the heart of the West End. Private equity houses are businesses that acquire other businesses -often very big businesses, and we know something about them at least (Gospel et al., 2014) . Family offices, however, are more mysterious entities. York, again, explains:
If you're really rich, you warrant an office...The global rich, increasingly, live in Mayfair…The people who look after their money -some of them astonishingly rich too -work there…Mayfair and St James's are absolutely humming with very superior butler typesmany of them well-bred Brits…We've become very good at looking after the rich…enabling away, smoothing the path. They're earning a very fair whack -as family-office men…but they're not…the principals, the owners, the definably super-rich themselves. They're super-help. The driving force is somewhere else, usually somewhere offshore (York, 2013: 52-54 137,727 278,825 157,540 67,685 641,777 6,148,065 6,789,842 Base: Adults with a permanent address in postcode districts within Greater London Source: Analysis of Mosaic data, 2010 The Postcode Locations of Global Power Brokers in Notting Hill
